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 Chapter 6 
 Deportation and forced return  
 Nassim  Majidi and  Liza  Schuster 
 Introduction 
 Since the end of the last century, there has been an increasing drive by states 
to forcibly remove people without permission to remain ( Anderson, Gibney 
and Paoletti, 2013 ;  Coutin, 2015 ). This drive is part of a growing restrictionism 
towards migration and migrants, regardless of whether the numbers of asylum 
seekers increased or decreased. Whereas for a number of decades, deportation 
was an exceptional weapon of migration control, by the end of the 1990s, it had 
become normalized ( Bloch and Schuster, 2005 ; Schuster, 2005) and the follow-
ing decade has seen the dismantling of many of the protections that had been 
put in place in order to reduce the deportation gap – the difference between the 
number of people with removal orders and those actually forcibly removed ( Gib-
ney, 2008 ;  Paoletti, 2010 ). 
 Persons liable to being forcibly returned from the territory of one state to 
another today include, depending on the expelling state: visa overstayers, undoc-
umented migrants, the children of those without papers, foreign nationals con-
victed of crimes and, perhaps most controversially, persons whose asylum claims 
have been rejected. The primary focus of this chapter is on the removal of those 
who start their journeys as forced migrants. For reason of space and of discipli-
nary choices this chapter is embedded in the forced migration literature. We will 
therefore not deal with the forced removal of foreign national criminals, over-
stayers or those who have been naturalized but deprived of their citizenship. 
 Deportation, acknowledged to be a brutal, expensive and ineffective state 
practice (Schuster, 2005;  Gibney and Hansen, 2003 ; Collyer, 2012) is variously 
referred to as expulsion, forced return, removal and involuntary repatriation. The 
use of terms such as administrative removal further confuses the issue and makes 
the assemblage of comparable data very diffi cult. We begin with an outline of the 
different terms used, and by whom. Following a review of the literature on forced 
return, we survey current deportation practices globally and explore the function 
of forced return for states. We have a particular emphasis on Afghanistan and 
Somalia as the authors work in these areas and as they are key countries of current 
migration trends. In the fi nal section, we focus on the impact of forced return, 
including what happens post-deportation. 
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 What is deportation? 
 Under normal circumstances, citizens may not be removed from, or denied entry 
to, the territory of their own state (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 
12), though states may withdraw citizenship from naturalized citizens in order to 
deport them (unless doing so would render them stateless). In particular, states 
are prohibited by law from returning people to the frontiers of territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, national-
ity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (Art.33, Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees). This principle of  non-refoulement 
is enshrined in European law and in the laws of its member states. 
 Terminologies on forced returns and forms of expulsion have varied from state to 
state ( Goodwin-Gill, 1983 ). Traditionally, in the United States, deportation was 
used to refer to those who were refused at the fi rst point of entry, and sent home. 
With time, deportations have grown to include those having already been granted 
access, but who may have been visa overstayers, failed asylum seekers, criminals, 
or foreign nationals – aliens – whose rights have been revoked. The terminol-
ogy remains varied: in the United Kingdom, the preferred administrative term is 
‘removal’, while under international law ‘expulsion’ is used ( Henckaert, 1995 ). 
 The word ‘expulsion’ is commonly used to describe that exercise of state power 
which secures the removal, either ‘voluntarily’, under threat of forcible removal, 
or forcibly, of an alien from the territory of a state ( Goodwin-Gill, 1983 : 201). 
Deportation is usually understood as the physical removal of a migrant from the 
territory of one state to another, against his/her will, but as implied by  Good-
win-Gill (1983 ), people may be forced to return by means other than physical 
compulsion ( Collyer et al., 2009 ). While many of those liable to forced removal 
might not be understood to be  forced migrants, deportation or forced return itself 
is a form of forced migration ( Gibney, 2013 ). 
 In Europe, the practice is referred to offi cially as forced return or removal and 
is governed by the European Returns Directive, as well as the national laws of 
individual Member States, which specify who is liable to forced return and under 
what conditions. Deportation is used by lawyers and policy-makers in the UK to 
refer to the forced removal of foreign national criminals (see  Paoletti, 2010 for 
discussion of the confusion between removal and deportation), while in France 
for example, it refers to the deportation of Jews by the Vichy regime. As such, the 
term deportation carries signifi cant historical weight and so is also the preferred 
term of anti-deportation activists and lawyers in the Anglophone world, while 
laws and regulations prefer forced return or removal. In this chapter, we use the 
terms interchangeably. 
 In a contribution to a  Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies Special Issue on 
 Deportation, Anxiety, Justice , Susan Bibler Coutin noted the differences between 
deportation and other forms of migration: 
 Deportation is forcible rather than voluntary, the decision to deport is in 
the hands of the state rather than that of individual migrants, the direction 
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of movement is from so-called receiving country to sending country and 
defi nitions of origin and membership are disrupted by the act of removal. 
Indeed, even to refer to deportation as a form of migration challenges com-
mon understandings of this term. 
 ( 2015 : 672) 
 However, as Coutin notes, in reading deportation as a form of forced migration, 
we call further into question the original assumptions of migration scholarship, 
including the neat split between forced and voluntary, the presumption that 
migration was a single unidirectional event, and the absence of the state. Depor-
tation involves physical, psychological and emotional compulsion ( Khosravi, 
2016 ) at the hands of the state. In terms of direction of movement, return may be 
to a country that is wholly unfamiliar, if, for example, one is an Afghan who was 
born and grew up in exile in Iran or Pakistan. Deportation is not always the end 
of the migration journey, not always a return to home: migration is multidirec-
tional, including for those deported, many of whom leave again and more than 
once ( Schuster and Majidi, 2013 ). 
 Deportation may describe the removal of an individual or family, as well as 
groups ranging from a handful of people by commercial fl ights from Europe to doz-
ens by chartered boats, buses and trucks to various countries of origin ( Schuster 
and Majidi, 2013 : 2015). 1 It can also refer to the mass deportations of thousands 
of families herded across borders into neighbouring territories, whether from 
Kenya to Somalia ( Majidi, 2017a ) or Iran or Pakistan to Afghanistan ( Human 
Rights Watch, 2017 ). Finally, the concept of force is a fl exible one. Some people 
who are classed as voluntary returnees may in fact feel that they have no choice 
but to return, and hence feel that their return has been forced upon them. 
 Deportation scholarship 
 In arguing that deportation is a form of forced migration,  Gibney (2013 ) queried 
why it had received so little attention from migration scholars. In the last dec-
ades of the 20th century there were a handful studies, but coinciding with the 
increased interest from states in deporting, there has been a steady growth in the 
literature on the subject through the 2000s. Academic literature on deportation 
initially focused on the earlier stages of the process, exploring the diffi culties of 
removing rejected asylum seekers ( Noll, 1997 ,  1999 ;  Phuong, 2005 ;  Ellermann, 
2005 ), resistance against deportation ( Nyers, 2003 ), and the dangers and injus-
tices of the deportation experience (Fekete, 2005;  Kanstroom, 2007 ). This criti-
cal view of the practice of forced return has continued, with scholars such as 
 Fischer (2015 ) and  DeBono, Rönnqvist and Magnusson (2015 ) drawing atten-
tion to the psychological damage infl icted on those awaiting deportation. 
 However, in the early 2000s, as the practice of deportation became normalized 
( Bloch and Schuster, 2005 ; Schuster, 2005), this focus was complemented by a 
growing body of literature on the place of deportation in the states anti-migration 
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arsenal ( Ellermann, 2009 ) and increasingly on the theoretical and practical 
implications of that normalization ( Bloch and Schuster, 2005 ) or what  Gibney 
and Hansen (2003 ) have referred to as the ‘deportation turn’ (see also  De Gen-
ova and Peutz, 2010 ). 
 De Genova (2002 ) has explained how deportability, the condition of being 
liable to forced return, creates an exploitable, oppressable, vulnerable workforce 
that serves the interest of globalized, capitalist economies (see also  Bloch and 
McKay, 2016 ). De Genova uses the concept of deportability to refer to the pro-
tracted possibility of being deported, which produces ‘practical, materially con-
sequential, and deeply interiorized modes of being’ ( De Genova and Peutz, 2010 : 
14). Underlining the negative impact of the threat of deportation, others describe 
it as part of the state’s apparatus to marginalize, terrify, exclude and expose ( Bloch 
and McKay, 2016 ;  Jones et al., 2017 ). In this view, deportation works on the 
deportable to make them compliant and exploitable. 
 Others have written on how deportation works for governing elites to reinforce 
the value and signifi cance of national citizenship, underlining the distinction 
between citizen and non-citizen, since the former cannot be deported ( Ander-
son, Gibney and Paoletti, 2013 : 2;  Walters, 2016 ). And yet, as underlined by 
scholars working in this fi eld, deportation also underlines the fuzziness of that 
distinction and the binding ties between citizen and non-citizen, which make 
deportation so brutal for those effected, including citizens. In 2017, the Dutch 
authorities forcibly removed a 60-year-old man from his wife of 40+ years to 
Afghanistan after 20 years. She had become a Dutch citizen and was in need of 
his care. They were left to fend for themselves separately, without family support 
or any source of income. 2 
 As deportation studies have multiplied, the focus has shifted to include more 
studies on what happens post-deportation (Peutz, 2006, 2010;  Brotherton, 2008 ; 
 Ruben, Van Houte and Davids, 2009 ;  Khosravi, 2009 ;  Schuster and Majidi, 
2013 , 2015), though the work on what happens to forced migrants returned 
against their will is still limited, and that on forced return within the global 
south even more so. There are of course practical reasons, besides ethnocen-
tricity, why there are so few studies conducted in refugee-generating countries. 3 
Nonetheless, scholarly attention to these inevitably brutal state practices and 
their consequences are particularly important, as there is no evidence that they 
will either decrease or become more humane (if that were possible), largely 
because, as  Gibney (2013 ) says, deportation carried out by the liberal state is 
largely seen as legitimate and just. 
 There are two other signifi cant gaps in the literature to date. First is an ethnog-
raphy of policy-making, which makes visible the calculations of those who devise 
the policies to be implemented.  Ellermann (2006 ) is one of the very few scholars 
working on the implementation of these policies by street-level bureaucrats but 
not from an ethnographic perspective. Second, since the sharply insightful over-
view by Chimni in 2004, there has been no further critical analysis of the role 
of the international community in implementing and legitimizing forced return, 
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accepting it as part of repatriation, one of its three durable solutions, the other 
two being local integration and resettlement. 
 History of deportation and forced returns 4 
 Deportatio , under the Romans, referred to a forced exile within the empire, often 
an island. The evolution from a citizen to a foreign national’s expulsion is a rather 
recent phenomenon. Return refers to the process of going back to one’s country 
of citizenship – if return is voluntary – and increasingly, the process of  sending 
back people to their country of citizenship – when return is forced. This shift – 
from going to sending, from voluntary to forced – has happened gradually, yet is 
accelerating as part of a discourse on solutions. Deportation is therefore closely 
linked to return migration. Return migration policies are increasingly used by 
states to manage migration. The assumption is that populations on the move, be 
it refugees, failed asylum seekers or migrants, can return to their home country, 
voluntarily or by force, to resume their lives in societies of origin. The aim is for 
return to strike a natural order in the international system. 
 Return or repatriation has traditionally been seen as the end of the migration 
cycle, including or especially for refugees ( Black and Koser, 1999 ), the point at 
which a host states responsibility to refugees ends. As  Anderson, Gibney and 
Paoletti (2013 ) have argued: deportation is an exercise of state authority that 
aims defi nitively to end the relationship of responsibility between the state 
and the non-citizen by forcing the non-citizen beyond the sphere of the state’s 
authority. The emphasis on return, in particular for refugees who were forced 
to leave their homes, assumes a natural order, that the right place is home, that 
somehow return is the best and most desirable outcome. Malkki (1995) has chal-
lenged the assumption that return serves to restore a natural ‘national’ order by 
returning people to where they belong, showing that refugees in exile were not 
necessarily an anomaly or uprooted, but may have created a home elsewhere. 
However diffi cult the situation in their new home, conditions in the country of 
origin may make return and reintegration impossible and therefore refugees (and 
non-refugees) may be reluctant to end their relationship with the receiving state. 
 However, the inability or unwillingness of many forced migrants to return to 
their countries of origin or habitual residence has led to an increased emphasis 
on forcing them to return.  Chimni (2004 ) tracks the steps that paved the way 
for this shift. The focus of the states of the Global North, expressed through 
UNHCR policy, moved from an emphasis on  resettlement (1945–85), essential 
for those who could not return home and who would provide a much-needed 
supplement to the North’s post-war depleted national labour forces, to  repatria-
tion (1986–1998), the preferred durable solution for states in the Global North 
unable to halt the arrival of refugees from the Global South. As described by 
Chimni, that second phase saw a shift from  voluntary to  forced repatriation, in 
spite of arguments such as Malkki’s (1995) and  Harrell-Bond’s (1989 ) that there 
was no research to suggest that repatriation was possible or appropriate for most 
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refugees. Chimni suggests that an idealized image of repatriation, of return, was 
used to legitimize what were in effect forced returns, as many refugees did not in 
fact volunteer to return, having created new homes in exile. 
 Next came a shift towards  safe return in the early 1990s following the Yugoslav 
wars as states took advantage of the absence of any reference to  voluntary return 
in the Geneva Convention (Hathaway, cited in  Chimni, 2004 ). As Chimni 
notes it merely called upon state parties to ensure safe return so that it is left to 
the state alone to decide when there has been a suffi cient change in the circum-
stances in the country of origin to warrant invoking the cessation clause (Art.1c, 
1951 Refugee Convention). In other words, the subjective perceptions of the 
state authorities are substituted for the experience of the refugee in making the 
decision that it is time to leave ( Chimni, 2004 ). 
 Chimni (2004 ) makes clear that state humanitarian responses to the arrival 
and presence of refugees are always politically driven. This is particularly evident 
from  Chimni’s (2004 ) description of the acceptance by UNHCR 5 that under a 
doctrine of  imposed return , refugees may be sent back to less than optimal condi-
tions in their home country against their will because it is happening anyway, 
because in the era of mass movements the doctrine of individual expression of 
free will to return has been less relevant and less used and because imposed return 
has become necessary because of pressure from host states and a lack of money 
to care for refugees (McNamara, cited in  Chimni, 2004 : 10–11). The hosts who 
were forcibly and massively returning refugees at the time were largely in the 
Global South (Sudan, Zaire, Tanzania), and they were doing so in the face of 
resistance by states in the Global North to share the responsibility and the intro-
duction of increasingly restrictive measures to prevent the arrival of refugees on 
European shores (it was at this time plans for processing centres in the region and 
in North Africa were mooted). In other words, the Global North did not have 
any moral authority to condemn these forced returns, which anyway worked in 
their interests. 
 Mass involuntary repatriation has a history as a weapon of weak states. Such 
states, who host far larger populations of refugees than states in the Global North, 
have used the threat of mass returns to exert pressure on the neighbouring state of 
origin (frequently an even weaker state) or on donor states in order to leverage fur-
ther resources or pursue a particular agenda. For example, Afghanistan’s neighbours 
Iran and Pakistan have, over the last 40 years, each hosted more than 2 million 
Afghans. At regular intervals, these states threaten and do push back thousands of 
people daily ( Turton and Marsden, 2002 ;  Human Rights Watch, 2017 ). 
 At the end of 2014, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan deteriorated 
as the latter accused its neighbour of sheltering the perpetrators of the attack 
on the Army Public School in Peshawar that killed 145 people, including 132 
children. Pakistan punished Afghan refugees by extending their residence per-
mits for only 6 months, then 3 months (instead of the 18–36 months as they 
had previously), and stepping up abuses and harassment so that there were three 
times as many returns in 2015 (181,000) compared with 2014 (61,000). In 2016, 
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when the Salma Dam, 6 fi nanced by India with a promise of a further $1 billion 
in aid, was inaugurated, Pakistan was furious and Afghan refugees felt the brunt 
of it ( Bjelica, 2016 ). In June during clashes on the border, a Pakistani Army 
Major was killed. That month, the numbers being returned daily reached 4,000–
5,000, with more than 600,000 Afghans returned from Pakistan in the space 
of 6 months (347,000 with refugee cards and 247,000 undocumented) ( Human 
Rights Watch, 2017 ). 7 
 Kenya has hosted Somali refugees since the 1990s, most in the Dadaab camps, 
which by 2011 had a population of half a million ( Lindley and Hammond, 2014 ). 
Originally, Kenya accepted Somalis fl eeing civil war and the collapse of the state 
in 1991 as  prime facie refugees, and again in the wake of the 2011 famine in Soma-
lia, on the understanding that their stay would be temporary and UNHCR would 
take care of them. In 1993, 170,000 Somalis were repatriated, but due to ongoing 
insecurity, drought and famine, many continued to be displaced and by the early 
2000s, repatriations had dwindled to a few hundred per year. However, this period 
saw the growth of Al-Shabaab, a radical Wahabist movement, in Somalia, and in 
2011 they allegedly began a series of deadly attacks in Kenya. In response, Kenya 
began to push for repatriations from the enormous Dadaab camp. They began 
deporting urban refugees in 2014 and announcing that ‘hosting refugees has to 
come to an end’. In 2013, UNHCR, Kenya and Somalia signed an agreement on 
the ‘voluntary repatriation’ of Somali refugees, but given the continued instabil-
ity in Somalia, the refugees were not easy to convince. 8 In 2016, the Kenyan 
government threatened to close the Dadaab camp complex by year’s end, de facto 
forcibly returning all of its population to Somalia. The vast majority of Somali 
refugees to date still do not want to return, and those who have returned lack the 
necessary information and networks to facilitate their reintegration, pointing to 
a failed return process ( Majidi, 2017a ). 
 In Europe, though the numbers are signifi cantly smaller (of both refugees and 
those forcibly returned), the drive to deport is increasing and the justifi cation 
used is the preservation of the asylum system, i.e., without the threat of deporta-
tion the system would be overwhelmed by fraudulent claims. The deterrent effect 
of deportation is treated as a given (in spite of a complete absence of any research 
data to that effect) and is used to justify the increase in returns and the introduc-
tion of measures to reduce the deportation gap. The 2015 EU Action Plan on 
Return ( European Commission, 2015 : 453 fi nal) argued that 
 One of the most effective ways to address irregular migration is the system-
atic return, either voluntary or forced, of those who do not or no longer have 
the right to remain in Europe. Fewer people that do not need international 
protection might risk their lives and waste their money to reach the EU if 
they know they will be returned home swiftly. 
 At the same time, acknowledging that voluntary returns are more effective (i.e., 
those who return voluntarily are more likely to remain in their countries of 
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origin) than forced returns, the document also states that the appeal of volun-
tary return schemes also depends on how credible the prospect of forced return 
is ( European Commission, 2015 : 3). There appears to be some truth in this. In 
the course of multiple fl ights to Kabul via Istanbul (between 2015 and 2017), 
Schuster met and spoke with dozens of such young men and a handful of families 
who described the pressure they had been subjected to in Norway and Turkey in 
particular (see  Khosravi, 2016 on Sweden), including being told that if they did 
not sign a document stating that they agreed to return, they would be physically 
removed, or not allowed to leave detention. They explained they had signed 
the voluntary return paper because they were told they had no choice, and this 
way they would be able to access some support on return. Such returns are more 
properly described as soft deportations ( Leerkes, Van Os and Boersema, 2017 ) 
and usually require fewer or no escorts, so are considerably cheaper, even when a 
return or reintegration package is included. 
 However, while the threat of hard deportations may increase the uptake of 
soft deportations, undocumented migration continues apace and many of those 
deported re-migrate ( Schuster and Majidi, 2013 ), leading us to question the jus-
tifi ability and utility of deportation, and with De Bono (2016) to argue that this 
presentation of returns as a necessary element of the solution to the refugee crisis 
is problematic because it is based on misconceptions about the experience of 
those returned, because there is no evidence to support the core deterrent argu-
ment and because so little is known about what happens post-deportation. 
 Nonetheless, EU states are determined to close the deportation gap ( Gibney 
and Hansen, 2003 ;  Paoletti, 2010 ), that is, the gap between the number of peo-
ple subject to deportation orders and those the state actually manages to deport, 
because of a range of constraints ( Gibney and Hansen, 2003 ). The deportation of 
those with established networks, who can offer support to the person targeted, is 
extremely diffi cult, while it is much easier to deport those already in detention. 
The practice of detaining those who  may be liable to deportation works in two 
ways – it makes the person targeted for forced return physically available, and it 
inhibits the creation and maintenance of networks which might interfere with 
the process of removal ( Tyler, 2017 ). However, objections to removal and to the 
violent restraints used have also been voiced by strangers, passengers on com-
mercial fl ights used to forcibly return individuals, resulting in a move towards 
collective forced removals using charter fl ights from EU member states. This is 
an expensive option and diffi cult to enforce without the cooperation of the coun-
tries of origin who have to accept the return of their citizens, as we will see in the 
next section. 
 Constraints on forced return 
 It seems that only 40% of migrants who have been given an order to leave the 
EU, actually leave ( Andrijasevic, 2010 ). Removal orders may not be carried out 
for a number of reasons, one of the most important being legal and human rights 
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constraints. While mass returns occur largely in the global south, a body of legal 
instruments, and of lawyers and migrant and human rights organisations make it 
more diffi cult to decide from one day to the next to expel large numbers of people 
from countries in the Global North. Even when the courts have decided an indi-
vidual is not a refugee and does not meet the refugee criteria, removal may not be 
possible. Protection may be granted to asylum seekers based on rights guaranteed 
by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. For 
example, the Prohibition on Torture (Art.3) and the right to Family and Private 
Life (Art.8) has protected those whose asylum claims have been rejected, but 
who have managed to build families, and whose rights would be infringed should 
the claimant be removed. Others are also exempt from deportation, including 
unaccompanied minors, who may not be removed until their 18th birthday; 
female headed-households from certain countries where they would be at risk; 
and those whose return would not be considered reasonable for example those 
with certain health conditions that cannot be adequately treated in the sending 
state. However, the law is not always respected, and individuals with family con-
nections, such as the Afghan man referred at the beginning of the chapter, have 
been forcibly returned. 
 It is at the street level that the true costs of deportation – the coercive uproot-
ing of individuals from their communities, families and workplaces – become 
most visible ( Rosenberger and Winkler, 2014 ;  Tyler, 2017 ). Supporters of those 
facing deportation work to make forced return diffi cult through lobbying and 
campaigning, and their demands to stop forced returns are often framed around 
the human costs to the community. As  Ellermann (2015 ) notes, this reframing 
of deportation in humanitarian terms threatens to undermine the legitimacy of 
bureaucratic decisions by reintroducing the deportee as a classmate, work col-
league, girlfriend, friend and human being – counteracting the dehumanizing 
narratives of failed asylum seeker. 
 Aside from the constraints in EU states, there is also the lack of cooperation 
with countries of origin, which make returns diffi cult. There is little cooperation 
from some states in verifying the nationality of those to be deported (De Bono, 
2016). For some states, there is little benefi t to be gained from facilitating the 
forced return of their citizens, in particular when their families rely on remit-
tances. It is often overlooked the extent to which asylum seekers and refugees 
remit and help to support and sustain families at home, and therefore the conse-
quences for those families post-deportation. In 2015, with an upturn in refugee 
arrivals, European policy-makers began to apply pressure not only to rejected 
asylum seekers but also to transit and origin states to prevent irregular migration 
and facilitate returns ( European Commission, 2015 : 453 fi nal). The Commission 
warned Member States that effective returns require political will and prioritisa-
tion and that the implementation of EU Return Directive, by the Member States 
leaves room for improvement ( European Commission, 2015 : 15). 
 A major step forward in terms of restricting arrivals and facilitating returns 
was the EU-Turkey deal, signed in 2016, whereby, in exchange for €3 billion 
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(later doubled) and the easing of visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, the Turkish 
authorities agreed to take back those who had transited Turkey to Greece and 
to prevent others from doing the same (there was also to be a resettlement pro-
gramme for Syrians from Turkey to the EU, so that for every Syrian arriving irreg-
ularly into Greece who Turkey took back, the EU would resettle one) ( Tunaboyla 
and Alpes, 2017 ). However, such a strategy only works if the transit country does 
not get stuck with those returned. Turkey currently hosts 3 million refugees, most 
of whom are from Syria, but there are also signifi cant numbers from Afghanistan. 
 In 2016, Afghanistan had the highest number of civilian casualties since 2001 
( UNAMA, 2017 ), the Taliban was in control of more than 50% of the country, 
there were major attacks by Daesh/ISIS and the Al Haqani network and a con-
certed effort by the EU states to push Afghan refugees back into Afghanistan. 
The appointment of a new Refugee Minister in 2015, Syed Alemi Balkhi, was 
a barrier to this intention, since he explicitly stated it was not safe to return 
people to Afghanistan and did his best to resist. EU states complained bitterly 
about the lack of cooperation, arguing that countries that refused to cooperate 
should not expect as much from donor states. Although it is a country still in 
confl ict, the EU Member States took advantage of the Brussels Donor conference 
in October 2016 to apply signifi cant pressure on the Afghan government, warn-
ing President Ghani that further aid could not be guaranteed unless an agreement 
(the  Joint Way Forward ) was signed in which the Afghan government promised to 
issue travel documents, assist with identifi cation and accept returns. 9 
 The number of people being deported from Europe to Afghanistan is rel-
atively low, certainly by comparison with forced returns from those whose 
host the majority of the world’s forced migrants. However, the plan to opera-
tionalize the  Joint Way Forward foresees a total of 10,000 returns in 2017: 
5,000 voluntary returns and 5,000 forced ( Bjelica and Ruttig, 2017 ). This 
would mean a more than 10-fold increase since 2016, which, UNAMA noted, 
had seen an overall the highest total civilian casualties recorded since 2009 
when UNAMA began systematic documentation ( UNAMA, 2017 ). The 
Afghan government, in spite of President Ghani’s statements, is being forced 
to accept these returns. In June 2017, both Minister Balkhi and his Deputy 
Minister pleaded in vain with EU MS to suspend deportations, pointing to 
the attacks that month that cost more than 150 lives in the capital alone, and 
the challenges of coping with returns from Pakistan and Iran. 
 This raises the question of  missing constraints. In spite of constraints just 
listed – legal, social and international – states push ahead with forced returns 
that are illegal, whether it is Pakistan harassing documented refugees, the Neth-
erlands abusing Art.1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention to refuse asylum to 
innocent men, Germany deporting a man with severe schizophrenia, or Norway 
separating families. Even though migration tribunals recognize that those apply-
ing for asylum have well-founded fears of persecution, they deport on the basis of 
the possibility of safe internal relocation, for example, that those being returned 
will be safe in Kabul, ignoring UNHCR guidelines that stress the importance of 
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social networks. In recent years, a growing number of legal and migration scholars 
have been arguing for the need for a post-deportation monitoring process as a way 
of avoiding these miscarriages of justice. 
 The arguments for the necessity of monitoring in deportation situations is built 
on three rights-based principles and protection safeguards: fi rst, that deportation 
can constitute  refoulement ; second, due to the risk of harm when they return to 
their country of origin; third, the lack of assistance, institutional support and 
social protection upon return (Bowerman, 2017;  Alpes et al., 2017 . Without 
monitoring, redress for errors (which may be fatal) is highly unlikely. On the 
other hand, the absence of monitoring makes it harder to prove that states have 
 refouled and are in breach of their obligations. 
 The impact of deportation 
 Although the literature on what happens post-deportation is growing, as noted 
previously, the work on what happens to rejected asylum seekers, particularly 
those from countries still in confl ict, is very limited. Nonetheless, some work 
has been done. The LOS country catalogue ( 2017 : 5), using country of origin 
and human rights organisations reports lists 27 countries, most of whom penalize 
undocumented exit with arrest and detention. There were also details of beating 
and harassment by police, in particular where claiming asylum is considered as 
treason. 
 However, being desk based, the catalogue focused largely on what happened 
in the short term. Little is known about the impact of deportation on rejected 
asylum seekers in the longer term, on women, on children or on the families 
of those returned (whether in the country of origin or the receiving country). 
Schuster and Majidi’s work in Afghanistan ( 2013 , 2015) points to a number of 
problems encountered, including being targeted as contaminated because of time 
spent in the West, and being stigmatized for failure, especially when the fl ight was 
fi nanced by selling or mortgaging family property. One consequence that became 
abundantly clear, was that in contrast to those who had genuinely chosen to 
return, the overwhelming majority of those who were returned against their will 
left again. It was also clear that aside from the physical risks to those deported 
and to their families, the failed investments in migration to Europe – because 
refugees do work and earn money and support families at home – was a huge bur-
den for many of the families. Nonetheless, some people make large profi ts from 
deportation. 
 The impact of deportation on psychosocial well-being is increasingly being 
reported in the scholarly literature, with empirical evidence on the effects of 
detention, deportability and deportation.  De Bono, Rönnqvist and Magnusson 
(2015 ) discuss the effects of deportability – or living in limbo in the country 
of destination – on migrants’ psychosocial well-being. The psychological effects 
of detention and deportation are experienced in the countries of reception as 
well as of return, leading to a layering of harms to mental health that often go 
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unaddressed and untreated upon return. In  Enduring Uncertainty ,  Hasselberg 
(2016 ) discusses the emotional and psychological impact of an uncertain sta-
tus, of deportability and deportation in the receiving country. In line with Dow’s 
previous work ( 2007 ), she reviews the lived experiences of deportation orders. 
A common thread in their accounts was the element of psychological damage, 
psychological torture ( Hasselberg, 2016 ) and changes in behaviour caused by the 
deportation order. Whether returned or not, the living conditions under uncer-
tainty and exclusion has an impact on psychological well-being. 
 The requirements for psychosocial well-being, as presented by  De Bono, Rön-
nqvist and Magnusson (2015 ), include (1) agency, autonomy and control, (2) 
participation and involvement, (3) social relationships and networks and (4) 
safety.  Ruben, Van Houte and Davids (2009 ) further discuss the impact of pre-
vious migration phases on psychosocial embeddedness, of which psychological 
well-being is one of the core elements. The authors argue that the layering of 
trauma during migration stages creates further instability. The symptoms they 
identify are depression, phobias and schizophrenia. Elsewhere  Majidi (2017b ) 
has shown that a common marker among deported migrants is the inability to 
negotiate their post-return lives, and to regain a sense of home. The lack of pre-
paredness in forced returns, the loss of control and networks, can put deportees 
in a state of psychosocial instability that leads to them feeling lost upon return. 
 The business of deportation 
 Deportations are not only part of an administrative component of migration and 
immigration systems, they are also big business (Walters, 2002, 2016;  De Gen-
ova, 2010 ). 10 The delegation of state authority ( Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000 ) has 
seen the involvement of other ‘local, private and transnational actors’ ( Andreas 
and Snyder, 2000 : 6), in particular private sector actors. The privatization and 
outsourcing of migration management has been discussed in the literature with 
the pioneering work of  Lahav (1998 ),  De Genova and Peutz (2010 ) and  Menz 
(2011 ). What were once key state functions are being delegated to private com-
panies for a fee: from running detention facilities or removal centres in the UK, 
transporting deportees on commercial fl ights, using private security contractors 
to escort deportees, or relying on construction companies in countries of origin 
to build reception or reintegration facilities. 
 The problem with the shifting of state tasks to private companies is precisely 
the introduction of a profi t motive for deportations. Such a motive creates incen-
tives to treat people as targets, as means to a profi t goal. Moreover, given the 
lack of oversight and monitoring it is inevitable that there will be casualties. 
In 2010, Jimmy Mubenga was removed from a British Airways fl ight at London 
Heathrow Airport by a private security fi rm – G4S – whose custody offi cers treat-
ment of Mr. Mubenga on board the plane led to a heart attack and subsequent 
death. Although medical records of the death clarifi ed the cause of death (choke-
hold and compression of the chest, despite being handcuffed and seated with 
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his seatbelt on), all G4S duty offi cers were cleared of charges during the trial. 
 Gammeltoft-Hansen (2013 ) predicted that the investigation would not yield any 
results as such cases outsource questions of liability. While grassroots mobilization 
targets the government to appeal or block deportation measures, private compa-
nies’ actions are hidden from public view, implying less liability and accountabil-
ity to the treatment of migrants and deportees. From private chartered fl ights to 
foreign security personnel, the amount of public information is still limited and 
warrants greater attention to the norms regulating such a deportation industry. 
 Conclusion: reflections on an inhumane 
and illiberal practice 
 Although, as we have argued, deportation has become normalized, and the pres-
sure to increase the number forcibly returned has increased, it is a blunt instru-
ment and the effects are felt by many more than those physically removed. When 
return contains an element of coercion and force it cannot be considered a dura-
ble solution – in particular when individuals are sent to states still in confl ict, 
with the economic and social consequences that entails. The rationale presented 
by policy makers is that return migration, combined with other measures, will 
deter irregular migration, send a strong message to traffi ckers and smugglers, pre-
serve the asylum space against asylum shopping and enforce international and 
national laws. Academics have been testing assumptions but not as rapidly as 
the policy world: return has been happening, whether assisted or unassisted, but 
its effects are under-explored. What do we know of the impacts of return migra-
tion policies and programmes? What happens to people, institutions and states 
in the wake of massive returns home? What happens after return to confl ict and 
post-confl ict settings? Return is proposed as inherently positive; as a concept, it 
is paired with other concepts such as reintegration, assuming that return is meant 
to be linked to a process of economic, social and cultural insertion back home. 
What are the consequences when the process of return fails? To date, studies 
indicate that reintegration rarely follows forced return and that re-migration is 
the most likely consequence ( Schuster and Majidi, 2013 ). 
 Notes 
 1  Walters (2016 ) has argued for greater attention to be paid to the practices and spaces 
involved in the transport of people being forcibly removed, and in particular for a 
critical analysis of the policies and practices involved. 
 2  The man was refused asylum on the basis of his employment in Afghanistan’s Com-
munist government in the 1980s/1990s. Letters from the Afghan government insist-
ing that he was not guilty or suspected of any crime were ignored. In 1999 the Dutch 
government drafted a report, which stated, quite simply, that all Afghan offi cers who 
had worked for the secret services and/or a liaison organisation in the eighties and 
the nineties, during the time that Afghanistan was considered a Soviet satellite state, 
were in fact war criminals. The consequence of this report was that if a refugee from 
Afghanistan had worked for the secret service as an offi cer, he (or she, but mostly he) 
would get an 1F-status and would be excluded from asylum and all social rights. Any 
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proof and/or piece of evidence from individual Afghan asylum seekers that they have 
been falsely accused and do not fall under 1F, was and is still today not accepted. This 
resulted in a situation where hundreds of Afghans were denied a status as refugees 
( EDAL, 2017 ). 
 3  A signifi cant practical reason is that rejected asylum seekers and refugees are fre-
quently being returned to states in confl ict, and research institutions rely increasingly 
on (risk averse) insurance companies to make the decision on whether it is safe to 
conduct research in those environments. Where they agree, it is frequently under 
security conditions that make research impractical, if not impossible. 
 4  We have focused on the history of forced return due to space limitations and because 
deportation historically involved a very wide range of people. 
 5  Specifi cally, Dennis McNamara, the Director of UNHCRs Division of International 
Protection (DIP), in September 1996 ( Chimni, 2004 : 10–11). 
 6  Another dam, in Herat Province, which threatens the water supply to Iran, may be 
behind the sharp increase in forced returns from that country in 2016 to 435,000, with 
a further 600,000 promised for 2017. 
 7  This case is particularly complex as UNHCR were accused of complicity in Pakistan’s 
mass re-foulement, encouraging people to return by increasing the cash support to 
each returnee from $200 to $400 ( HRW, 2017 ), and the reaction of the Afghan Presi-
dent which was to encourage further returns with wholly unrealistic promises of land, 
homes and jobs ‘as many as 30 million people live in Afghanistan and that the return 
of two or three million more people would not have such a bad impact on the current 
situation in the country’ (Ghani, cited in  Bjelica, 2016 ). 
 8  A joint return intention survey conducted by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) and UNHCR Kenya revealed that only 2.6% of refugees in Dadaab 
intended to return to Somalia in 2014. 
 9  Ministers Balkhi (Refugees and Repatriation), Iklil (Finance), Zakhi (National Secu-
rity Council) and Rabbani (Foreign Affairs) each stood up before Parliament and 
explained that the Europeans had threatened them with cancelling future aid if they 
failed to sign. 
 10  The involvement of transportation companies in deportation and mass expulsions has 
a long history. Walters (2002), for example, highlights the participation of train com-
panies under the Nazi regime and the use of shipping companies in England’s transpor-
tation of a criminal class to New South Wales and, as noted above, the contemporary 
use of the airline industry to deport unwanted aliens and refused asylum seekers back 
to countries of origin worldwide. 
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